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A QUEST TO INCREASE WOMEN IN CORPORATE
BOARD LEADERSHIP: COMPARING THE LAW IN
NORWAY AND THE U.S.
Angela R. Foster †
Abstract: Gender imbalance is a persistent problem on corporate boards the
world over. Women are severely underrepresented in these important leadership
positions within public companies. Norway took a big swing at inequality in 2003 by
enacting a quota law requiring at least 40% representation of each gender on boards of
directors of public companies. Norway now has the highest percentage of women
serving on corporate boards. Through Securities and Exchange Commission regulations,
the United States enacted a diversity disclosure rule that requires public companies to
divulge their policy regarding gender in board hiring. The disclosure rule has proven
ineffectual, and at the current rate of change, it will take 70 years for women to gain
equal seats on U.S. corporate boards.
Many stereotypes about women in the workplace persist, making it difficult for
women to climb to the top of the corporate hierarchy. A closer look at the barriers to
women’s success reveals that advocates of gender equality on corporate boards may need
to change tactics in the U.S. and advocate for stronger government intervention in the
private sphere in order to achieve change more quickly. Short of imposing a quota,
which is highly unlikely in the United States, what can advocates learn from the
advancements made in Norway?

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF GENDER IMBALANCE ON
CORPORATE BOARDS

Women, worldwide, are severely underrepresented on corporate
boards of directors. Women hold only 12% of board seats globally, and only
4% of companies are chaired by women. 1 Nearly one-fifth of the world’s
200 largest companies have no woman directors at all.2 Around the globe,

†

The author would like to thank Professor Melissa Durkee for her time, wisdom, and insight.
Press Release, Deloitte, Women joining but not leading boardrooms globally (June 10, 2015)
(https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/women-joining-not-leadingboardrooms-press-release.html#); see also DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gxccg-women-in-the-board room-a-global-perspective4.pdf.
2
BIZ DIVAS & KHAITAN & CO., WOMEN ON BOARDS: A POLICY, PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION
ROADMAP 2 (2014), http://bizdivas.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/women_on_boardV3-PRINT.pdf.
1
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corporate boards lack gender diversity, with the exception of those countries
that have mandated gender quotas.3
The question of who gets appointed to boards of directors of publicly
traded corporations is an important one because boards affect the lives of
millions of employees and consumers.4 Boards shape companies’ financial
and operational policies, and as recent history has shown, scandal or poor
judgment on boards of directors at large companies can have enormous costs
for the global economy and society at large.5 In addition to being highly
influential, board positions are among the most highly paid and prestigious
positions in the business world. 6
In the United States, recent studies indicate that although gender
diversity has increased a small amount on public company boards, directors
do not reflect the demographics of the U.S. population or the labor force. 7
Similarly, in the United States 19.2% of corporate board seats are held by
women.8 At current rates of change in the U.S., it will take almost seventy
years before women’s representation on corporate boards is equal with
men’s.9
In contrast, Norway, Sweden, and Finland all have quota laws and
have the highest percentages of women on boards at 40.9%, 27% and 26.8%
respectively.10 As of 2013, women held only 13.7% of board seats in the
3

Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity On Corporate Boards: How Much Difference
Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 379 (2014).
4
Id. at 378.
5
Id.
6
Angelo Young, India Women’s Rights: Nearly A Third of India’s Big Companies Could Miss
Deadline To Appoint Women To Corporate Boards, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2015,
http://www.ibtimes.com/india-womens-rights-nearly-third-indias-big-companies-could-miss-deadlineappoint-1848206; Seletha R. Butler, “Financial Expert”: A Subtle Blow to the Pool and Current Pipeline
of Women on Corporate Boards, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20 (2013) [hereinafter, Butler, Financial
Expert].
7
Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity Rationale, 42
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 597 (2011).
8
Catalyst Inc., 2014 Catalyst Census: Women Board Directors, 1, 1 (2014),
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2014-catalyst-census-women-board-directors [hereinafter 2014 Catalyst
Census].
9
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3 at 381.
10
AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE,
AND DIVERSITY 3 (2015).
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largest publicly listed companies in the European Union, which itself does
not impose any quota requirement.11
The current worldwide gender disparity on boards of directors
indicates that the most respected and high-paying positions in the corporate
world are not open to women. Attention to gender equality in the workplace
and on boards is important because work is the avenue by which men and
women alike attain the most basic necessities they need to live.12 Gender
biases that systematically disadvantage women permeate corporate culture,
reducing women’s access to sustaining and meaningful work. 13 The
availability of meaningful, fairly compensated work, or lack thereof, has
broad impacts, influencing whether women are educated, where and with
whom they live, whether they have children, or whether they work at all.14
Equality for women means having at least “as much” structural access to
power as the dominant group has.15
As women struggle for equal representation in corporate workplaces,
the private sector has consistently fought the idea that governments have an
affirmative duty to promote gender equality on boards of directors. The role
of the state in helping to equalize opportunities in private spheres such as the
workplace is greatly debated.
Government intervention strategies can range from “weak” to
“radical.”16 In working to increase gender diversity on boards of directors in
publicly traded companies governments have used a range of strategies from
“comply and explain” disclosure requirements (as seen in the U.S.) to strict

11

Fawn Lee, Note, Show Me The Money: Using the Business Case Rationale to Justify Gender
Targets in the EU, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1471, 1473 (2013).
12
Meredith Render, The Man, The State and You: The Role of the State in Regulating Gender
Hierarchies, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 73, 108 (2006).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 104.
16
Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 71
(2009) (characterizing Norway’s intervention into the private sector by way of the quota law as “radical”
and characterizing more moderate intervention as “soft.” Here I have used “weak”).
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quota systems (as seen in Norway). 17 The United States exemplifies a
“weak,” disclosure-based intervention style while Norway has adopted a
“radical” intervention strategy, requiring that corporate boards of public
companies maintain near gender parity on their boards or risk dissolution.18
This comment provides an overview of American and Norwegian
laws regarding diversity on boards of directors and discusses ways that
Norway’s successful quota law might influence the policy discourse in the
United States. Part II of this paper looks to scholarship from the corporate
business sector and the social sciences to provide an in-depth discussion of
the barriers to entry that women face in entering corporate leadership,
including the many ways that gender discrimination is institutionalized
within the business sector’s policies and procedures. Part III will discuss the
social political climate that has led to weak regulatory intervention in the
United States through a disclosure-based board diversity rule. Part IV will
discuss the quota law in Norway and some of the social and political aspects
of Norwegian society that led to this radical but effective government
intervention. Lastly, this Comment will discuss lessons that American
advocates of gender equality on boards can take from Norway’s successful
transition to near-gender parity on public boards of directors.
II.

BARRIERS TO ENTRY

The continued disparity between the percentage of women in the
workforce and their low representation on boards of directors indicates that
women are experiencing significant barriers that are keeping them from
advancing. 19 Additionally, the mere passage of time will not eliminate these
barriers.20 A variety of unseen factors are impeding the upward mobility of
women in corporations, such as lack of mentorship, role models, and
sponsors; pay disparities that make it less worthwhile for women to work in
17

Douglas M. Branson, Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate Boards of Directors—A Global
Snapshot, 37 J. CORP. L. 793, 802–03 (2012); Deborah L. Rhode and Amanda K. Packel, Diversity On
Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 418 (2014).
18
See Rosenblum, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 71–72.
19
Lisa M. Fairfax, Women and the “New” Corporate Governance: Clogs in the Pipeline, The Mixed
Data on Women Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 580 (2006).
20
Id.
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high demand and highly demanding positions; and an unwillingness among
managers to give women responsibility commensurate with their male
colleagues.21
Board appointments may be influenced by overt racism and sexism,
but unconscious biases are more common.22 While overt discrimination is
less common than it used to be, discrimination continues as a result of
institutions in the workplace, including “corporate culture, informal norms,
networking, training, mentoring and evaluation.”23
A survey of the relevant literature shows that the most common
barriers to women’s advancement in corporate leadership are, (A) in-group
bias that causes current leaders to promote subordinates who they perceive
to be like them, (B) androcentric values in the workplace and negative
assumptions about women’s competence, (C) lack of access to corporate
management and executive-level leadership experience, and (D) continued
reliance on the prevalent but ineffectual “business case” argument.
A.

In-Group Bias Among Current Corporate Board Members
Causes Boards Not to Seriously Consider Woman Candidates

One barrier to entry for women is “in-group” bias, which is the
preference that individuals feel for others who are like them in important
respects such as race, ethnicity, and gender.24 In-group bias is particularly
demonstrated by groups that enjoy social privilege25 and in settings where
selections are highly subjective, such as board appointments. 26 Furthermore,
in-group bias often keeps women out of the informal networks of mentorship
21

DHIR, supra note 10, at 29; Render, supra note 12, at 74.
DHIR, supra note 10, at 54.
23
Render, supra note 12, at 89 (using the term “second generation” discrimination to describe the
less overt forms of workplace discrimination that are more common in the modern workplace) (quoting
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 420 (2004)).
24
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 404; see also McKinsey & Co., Women Matter, 17 (2012),
https://www.mckinsey.de/files/mckinsey_women_matter_2012.pdf (stating that people “feel more
comfortable promoting those who behave and think most like themselves—in other words, men—and fail
to appreciate different leadership styles”).
25
See DHIR, supra note 10, at 50–51.
26
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 405.
22
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that can lead to board appointments. 27 Board members tend to choose
candidates who are within the board nominating committee’s or company
CEO’s “circle of acquaintance,” and those committees and
acquaintanceships do not include many qualified women. 28 For example,
one executive at a large European corporation told researchers that he
believed people within his company felt “the top jobs somehow belonged to
men.”29
The supposed lack of qualified woman candidates for board positions
is actually a problem of implicit cognitive biases coupled with the fact that
the networks of existing directors are limited and impede entry of
outsiders.30 It is illustrative, for example, that male and female directors
explain the lack of women on corporate boards differently. 31 Men tend to
attribute the gender imbalance to a “pool problem,” citing lack of women in
executive-level positions as the reason that fewer women are on boards. 32
On the other hand, women directors are more likely to explain the lack of
female directors as a function of established male networks and the influence
of those informal networks on board appointments.33
The board nomination process can be particularly “clubby” with allmale executive committees or male CEOs looking to nominate friends and
associates who are also predominately male. 34 For this reason, getting more
women into entry-level and middle management-level positions alone will
not necessarily get them into the most competitive leadership positions—
men in power still overlook capable women because they are looking for
candidates who look like them. 35

27

Id.
Burch, supra note 7, at 601.
29
McKinsey & Co., supra note 24, at 17.
30
DHIR, supra note 10, at 10.
31
Id. at 38.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Tamara S. Smallman, Note, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’s Role In Cracking The Door Open
So Women May Enter, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 808 (2013).
35
McKinsey & Co., supra note 24, at 19.
28
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In-group bias continues to negatively impact women even if they
succeed in making it to the top. For example, in one study, almost half of
female respondents who held upper management positions in Fortune 1000
companies reported exclusion from informal networks of communication
while only about 20 percent of male respondents cited such exclusion.36
Proactive companies can combat the effects of in-group bias. For
instance, one diversified European company studied by McKinsey & Co.
uses a strategy to increase gender diversity on its board wherein the
company leadership devotes an entire session in its succession planning
process to discussing only female candidates.37 The goal of the strategy is to
force the leadership to consider high-performing women and to develop an
environment in which women can contribute and succeed “rather than
coming up with reasons why it will be hard for them to do so.”38
B.

Androcentric Values in the Workplace and Negative
Assumptions About Women’s Competence Stall Women’s
Professional Advancement

Androcentrism is the institutionalized pattern of cultural value that
privileges traits associated with masculinity, while devaluing feminine
traits. 39 Pervasively institutionalized through law, policy, and standard
professional practices, androcentric value patterns “structure broad swaths of
social interaction,”40 including the private business sector. Institutionalized
androcentrism causes women to suffer gender-specific forms of “status
subordination,” including “sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic
violence; trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning stereotypical depictions
in the media; disparagement in everyday life; exclusion or marginalization in
public spheres and deliberative bodies; and denial of the full rights of equal

36

Katherine Giscombe, Women in Corporate Leadership: Status and Prospects, in WOMEN AND
LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 383, 389 (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah
L. Rhode eds., 2007).
37
McKinsey & Co., supra note 24, at 19.
38
Id.
39
NANCY FRASER, FORTUNES OF FEMINISM: FROM STATE-M ANAGED CAPITALISM TO NEOLIBERAL
CRISIS 162 (2013).
40
Id.
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protection and citizenship.”41 Some forms of status subordination, such as
sexual harassment, trivialization, or stereotypical depictions, are common
within the workplace.42
Corporate culture and practices assume that women are less capable
and that their work is less valuable. Historically, gender has been an
underlying organizing principle of the division of labor—defining who
performs paid “productive” and unpaid “reproductive” labor.43 A division
within paid labor also occurred along gendered lines: historically, higher
paid professions, such as manufacturing and professional occupations like
lawyering or business have been reserved exclusively for men while lower
paying domestic or service occupations have been filled by women. 44
Women’s labor is still consistently undervalued. In fact, a recent
study shows that when women move into occupations formerly dominated
by men, those jobs begin to pay less.45 Another recent study, conducted by
American and British researchers analyzing data regarding 4,600 Australian
workers from more than 800 employers showed that men and women asked
for pay increases at the same rate.46 A lack of assertiveness in negotiating
for higher pay is often cited as a reason that women make less money than
men for similar work. This theory “‘places some of the responsibility for the
existence of gender differentials upon female employees and the choices
they make,’ rather than structural biases.”47 These findings directly refute
that theory and show that there is an element of gender bias working against
women. 48 These results occur because employers place a lower value on
work done by women. 49 The lasting legacy of gender as an organizing
41

Id. at 162–63.
Id.
43
Id. at 162.
44
Id.
45
Claire Cain Miller, As Women Take Over a Male-Dominated Field, the Pay Drops, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/upshot/as-women-take-over-a-male-dominated-fieldthe-pay-drops.html?_r=0.
46
Jamiles Lartey, Women ask for pay increases as often as men but receive them less, study says,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/05/gender-wage-gapwomen-pay-raise-men-study.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Miller, supra note 45.
42
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principal in employment lingers, and the result is a continuing economic
structure that generates gender-specific forms of distributive economic
injustice.50
Within the context of high-paid professions, such as business
management, men are often presumed to be competent, and women
conversely are often presumed to be incompetent. 51 This presumption of
male competence or natural male leadership ability is institutionalized
through management literature, which implicitly links men and masculinity
with leadership and authority. 52 Because of the androcentric workplace
values that privilege masculinity and result in bias that women are less
competent, women have to work harder to achieve the same recognition. 53
For example, in one Harvard Business School experiment, MBA students
were given two case studies, which were identical except that in one the
CEO was named John and in the other the CEO was named Jane. 54 Students
rated the CEO named Jane negatively compared to their ratings of the CEO
named John.55 The students’ reaction shows a clear gender stereotype that
men are more competent business leaders than women. 56 Another study, by
Thomas-Hunt and Phillips, “suggests that women [in workgroups] are often
penalized when they possess the same expertise that men have.” 57
Additionally, although recent studies show that individuals with stellar
interpersonal skills are more effective leaders, individuals who display
stereotypically masculine leadership styles are more likely to be appointed to
corporate leadership positions.58

50

FRASER, supra note 39, at 162.
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 406; DHIR, supra note 10, at 50.
52
Giscombe, supra note 36, at 391.
53
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 406.
54
Id. at 407.
55
Id.
56
CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 28
(2012), http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/csri_gender_diversity_and_corporate_per
formance.pdf.
57
DHIR, supra note 10, at 50 (citing Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt & Katherine W. Phillips, When What
You Know Is Not Enough: Expertise and Gender Dynamics in Task Groups, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1585, 1594 (2004)).
58
Giscombe, supra note 36, at 391.
51
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The androcentric ordering of gendered preference has remained a
static element in the workplace despite the popularity of diversity as a
supposed new priority. 59 The desirability of gender diversity affords
advancement opportunities to a small percentage of women who happen to
have characteristics that are closer to androcentric ideals.60 A few women
achieve positions of power while most women remain in positions of
relatively low pay, respect, and responsibility.61 Considering the fact that
only 19% of board seats on corporate boards of U.S. public companies are
filled by women, it is clear that the current emphasis on diversity is only
benefitting a small percentage of women rather than creating real change in
the institutions that are keeping women out of leadership positions.62 For
over 40 years Title VII has mandated gender-integrated workplaces in the
United States, but women continue to inhabit a markedly subordinate sphere
in the workplace.63
C.

Lack of Access to Executive Level Experience Keeps Women Off
of Boards

As a result of in-group bias, entrenched androcentric values, and other
conscious and unconscious biases, women are not getting opportunities to
fill top leadership positions within corporations. The most commonly stated
reason for underrepresentation of women on corporate boards is that women
lack leadership experience in the upper echelons of corporate management. 64
The typical qualifications desired in directors include financial expertise,
executive-level industry experience, knowledge or training regarding
corporate governance, and independence (non-affiliation with the
corporation).65 Many public company boards consist mostly of current or
retired CEOs of other public companies.66

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Render, supra note 12, at 90.
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 91.
2014 Catalyst Census, supra note 8.
Id. at 77.
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 402.
Burch, supra note 7, at 600.
Butler, Financial Expert, supra note 6, at 31.
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There are far fewer women in the ranks of executive-level corporate
management, which makes it difficult for women to gain executive-level
industry experience.67 Women in the United States graduate from college
and professional programs at higher rates than men,68 but women make up
only 3.5% of Fortune 1000 CEOs and 14.6% of Fortune 500 executive
officers.69 Similarly, research in Europe shows that in many of the largest
500 corporations, women are recruited in numbers that are comparable to
their male counterparts, but women become increasingly underrepresented
as they move higher up the organization. 70
Women may be given fewer opportunities to do high-profile projects
in upper management because of stereotypical beliefs about women’s
abilities and interests, such as the assumption that women do not want jobs
or tasks that require “significant time away from the family.” 71 One
example of this is that hiring committees often look for director candidates
who have international experience.72 Because of the assumption that women
with families find it more difficult than men with families to relocate or
travel for extended periods, women are often not even considered for
international assignments.73 Despite this persistent stereotype that women
are not interested in ambitious projects that might require significant time
away from the family, research shows that women in top management
positions in the United States have ambition equal to that of their male
counterparts.74 In a 2004 study by Catalyst of top management in Fortune
500 companies, majorities of both women and men wanted to be CEO of an
67

Id.
Render, supra note 12, at 76 n.3 (statistics relating to gender of law school graduates and attorneys
who make partner); Matt Egan, Still missing: Female business leaders, CNN MONEY (Mar. 24, 2015, 1:49
PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/24/investing/female-ceo-pipeline-leadership/.
69
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 403.
70
MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 29, at 7.
71
Giscombe, supra note 36, at 388, 391; see also MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 29, at 17.
72
Boris Groysberg & Deborah Bell, Dysfunction in the Boardroom: Understanding the Persistent
Gender Gap at the Highest Levels, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2013, at 88, 91.
73
Id.
74
Giscombe, supra note 36, at 386 (This finding is echoed in a more recent study of 1400
international executives, in all major regions, which found that women’s aspirations to rise into top
leadership positions are nearly equal to men’s. Just under 80% of women in top or middle management
positions aspire to move up to top leadership positions while just over 80% of men do. See MCKINSEY &
CO., supra note 24).
68
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organization.75 Assumptions about women’s priorities and ambition, rather
than women’s actual priorities and ambition, keep hiring committees from
considering women for positions that could be key to advancing their careers
to director level.
Less diversity among senior executives leads to less diversity among
potential board candidates where executive-level industry experience is
often viewed as a prerequisite. 76 One study of 1,000 corporate directors
found that male directors more often define “qualified” as having prior
executive-level experience.77 About half of male Fortune 500 directors are
CEOs or former CEOs. 78 This standard is, however, seemingly more
harshly applied to women. 79 For instance, “vastly more men currently serve
[as directors] without CEO experience.” 80 This shows that in order to
become board members, women must attain a higher level of preparedness.
That CEO experience is a “pre-requisite” to board service is much more true
for women than men.
D.

The Business Case for Greater Gender Diversity On Boards Is
Not Enough To Overcome Other Barriers

The business case for gender diversity—that is, the correlation
between gender diversity in leadership and positive corporate financial
performance—is contested at best. 81 The slow growth of gender parity
indicates that the business case alone is not enough to cause businesses to
75

Id.
Burch, supra note 7, at 600.
77
DHIR, supra note 10, at 39.
78
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 402.
79
CATALYST, THE “THINK DIRECTOR, THINK CEO” MYTH: FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES (2012), http://
www.catalyst.org/system/files/The_Think_Director_Think_CEO_Myth_Fortune_500_Companies.pdf.
80
Id. In an ethnographic study of around 300 female directors and 100 male directors, 68% of
women had CEO experience while only 51% of men did. Groysberg & Bell, supra note 72, at 90 (noting
also that there are vastly more men than women serving as directors, which may partially account for the
disparity).
81
See generally Rhode & Packel, supra note 3; Susan Adams, Women On Boards: Slow Progress
And
Marginalization,
Study
Shows,
FORBES
(June
11,
2015,
1:57
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2015/06/11/women-on-boards-slow-progress-andmarginalization-study-shows/#7c79f01b3745; James A. Fanto et al., Board Diversity and Corporate
Performance: Filling in the Gaps: Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901 (2011); Lee, supra note
11, at 1483–86.
76
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adopt more gender inclusive selection processes for boards of directors. It is
hotly contested whether greater gender diversity on boards of directors will
cause short or long-term benefits to corporations.
Studies show variable results regarding whether increased numbers of
women on boards increases profitability or not. Some empirical evidence
suggests that women are more financially risk averse than men and for that
reason, commentators have speculated that the presence of at least one
woman on a board leads to more accurate financial reporting and more
prudent financial decision-making. 82 Other commentators speculate that
board diversity is productive on boards because it generates cognitive
conflict because the board members draw on a wide range of perspectives.83
Some studies have shown a positive correlation between board diversity and
other measures of good governance such as more board meetings, higher
attendance rates, greater participation in decision making, tougher
monitoring, and replacement of the CEO when the corporation’s stock
performs poorly.84 Yet another study showed that boards with at least two
women paid greater attention to audit and risk oversight than all-male
boards.85
The non-profit Catalyst, consulting company McKinsey & Co., and
financial services company Credit Suisse produced influential research that
makes the case that gender diversity in board leadership and management at
least correlates with better company performance. 86 As with anything,
however, correlations do not necessarily demonstrate causation and few

82

Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 394.
Id. at 395–96.
84
Id. at 400; Fairfax, supra note 19, at 590.
85
Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 400–01.
86
CREDIT SUISSE RES. INST., supra note 56, at 6 (stating that Catalyst’s studies show that Fortune
500 companies with more women on their boards tend to be more profitable and the McKinseys’ studies
show that companies with a higher proportion of women on their boards exhibit a “higher degree of
organization, above-average operating margins and higher valuations”).
83
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studies have claimed to show that board diversity leads to better financial
performance.87
Empirical evidence on the issue of whether board diversity increases
shareholder value is mixed. 88 Other studies assert that diversity in the
boardroom can enhance a corporation’s bottom line by helping it reach out
to a larger and more diverse base of customers, clients, and employees. 89
Catalyst’s 2004 study of 353 Fortune 500 companies found a link between
high representations of women in management (defined as women corporate
officers and top earners) and financial performance. 90 Follow up studies by
Catalyst for 2004 through 2008 found a similar link. 91 Catalyst clearly states
that its studies should not be taken to show a causal link. 92
Despite a potential positive correlation between gender diversity and
performance, studies, including the previously cited Credit Suisse report,
show that there is no causation between greater gender diversity,
profitability, and stock price performance. 93 The authors of these studies
hypothesize that the appointment of more women to a board is a signal that a
corporation is already doing well. 94 Some studies have claimed that better
financial performance positions a corporation to attract a more diverse board,
to devote more resources to recruiting diverse directors, or that a completely
different factor could be causing the correlation.95 Increased diversity may
cause boards to be less cohesive and less efficient.96 Some studies have also
shown that without a critical mass of women on a board of directors, the
women who are present may not express their diverse viewpoints.97 These
87
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studies show that is also possible that any added value from diversity on
boards depends on the extent or balance of diverse representation.98 Mere
presence of diverse voices on boards without efforts to include them in
decision-making may prove fruitless, for example.99
Scholarship on business law is often divided into two camps: law and
economics scholars who prioritize efficiency in the marketplace and scholars
from a variety of other perspectives that prioritize justice. 100 Both of these
groups seem to recognize that there is a trade-off between efficiency and
fairness when it comes to incorporating more gender diversity into corporate
boards. 101 Because this trade-off exists, it is hard to make the case for
diversity in the context of publicly traded corporations where short-term
returns matter a lot and diversity initiatives often promise short-term cost for
long-term payoffs.102
III.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE CORPORATE BOARD
GENDER DIVERSITY: WEAK INTERVENTION MODEL

In the United States, public corporations are governed by statutes and
regulations at both the state and federal level, which disperses the
government’s regulatory power over corporations among multiple policy
making bodies. 103 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
made an attempt at implementing regulations to address diversity in the

98
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workplace, but such efforts amount to weak and ultimately ineffectual
intervention.
Whether and how the United States government should intervene to
promote diversity in the workplace is influenced somewhat, by the
sensibility of the body politic. For a time leading up to the 1980s, there was
strong political momentum in support of government intervention in the
private sector to prevent discrimination. 104 In the 1980s, a “conservative
political philosophy” took hold in the United States, which elevated the
“autonomy and privacy dimensions of individual freedom.”105 This shift in
philosophy emphasized the “autonomy interest” of possible discriminators
against the “public value of repairing class-based distributive inequities.”106
A study of American law review discourse over a recent twenty-five-year
period shows that legal scholars discussed “command-and-control”
regulatory power as “coercive,” “legalistic,” “uniform,” “costly,” and
“ineffective.” 107 In the words of one legal scholar, “Bashing traditional
regulation has become something of a national pastime among legal
scholars.”108
Despite the anti-regulation turn taken in American political sentiment,
American corporations are subject to both state and federal laws and
regulations. The foundational duties of corporate directors are established
under state law.109 For instance, the Corporation Law of Delaware requires
that the “business affairs of every corporation [ . . . ] shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors.”110 Furthermore, the directors
owe duties of care, loyalty, and good faith to the corporation’s
shareholders.111 The board of directors plans the direction of the company
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and monitors and evaluates senior management’s implementation of the
business plan.112
A.

Role of Securities and Exchange Commission

Corporations are subject to federal anti-trust and securities laws that
seek to protect consumers and investors. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a federal
agency in response to the great stock market crash of 1929 that led to the
Great Depression.113 The SEC oversees the securities industry and enforces
the securities laws that Congress enacts.114 The SEC’s mission is to protect
investors; to sustain fair, orderly, and efficient capital markets; and to
facilitate capital formation. 115 The federal securities laws impose an
elaborate system of mandatory disclosure rules and periodic reporting
rules.116
The goal of disclosure-based systems is to help investors manage
risk by facilitating “informed investment decisions” and efficient capital
markets. 118 Despite a broad statutory grant of power, the SEC has
sometimes interpreted its mandate narrowly. 119 To effectuate informed
investing, the federal securities laws require publicly traded firms to report
to the SEC on a wide range of internal governance and financial matters
quarterly and annually.120 Additionally, public companies must submit an
annual report containing audited financial statements and other information
117
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to shareholders in connection with the corporation’s annual proxy
solicitation.121
When Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it signaled that stronger substantive
regulation of public companies and the financial markets might be in
store.122 The Dodd-Frank Act created the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, required regulation of derivative markets, and created a council of
federal regulators led by the Treasury Secretary. 123 However, Congress’s
appetite for strong intervention was short-lived.124 In fact, since the DoddFrank moment in 2010, Congress has shifted back to a disclosure-based
governance model, enacting disclosure requirements in 2011 and 2012 on
topics such as use of “conflict minerals” from the Republic of Congo in a
corporation’s products; corporate mine operators’ health and safety
violations; and corporate activities related to Iran.125 In all of these cases,
the laws require no substantive change in corporate behavior, but rather
attempt to effectuate a change in behavior indirectly. 126
Similarly, the SEC and other federal agencies continue to intervene
indirectly rather than directly in corporate governance matters.127 Through
its federal enforcement authority, the SEC effectuates corporate governance
changes through the issuance of reports of investigations, and settled
enforcement actions.128 Additionally, the SEC has powerful regulatory tools
121
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at its disposal. For instance, the SEC can impose monetary civil penalties
for securities law violations. 129 The SEC also has the power to issue a “stop
order” that suspends a corporation’s registration statement and suspends
trading in a security for up to ten days.130 This remedy is available when the
SEC believes that the “public interest and the protection of investors so
require.” 131 Finally, the SEC can subject corporations to disciplinary
sanctions, including suspension and revocation of registration, for failure to
follow requirements.132
B.

The SEC’s Diversity Disclosure Rule: A Weak Intervention

In the United States, women make up 16% of corporate boards and
roughly 14% of corporate executives.133 The SEC, recognizing that gender
imbalance on boards is a continuing problem, enacted a disclosure-based
diversity initiative in 2009. 134 The Proxy Disclosure Enhancements
Regulation (diversity disclosure rule), which took effect on February 28,
2010, 135 requires companies to disclose “whether, and if so, how the
nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying
nominees for director.”136 Furthermore, the company is supposed to disclose
how the diversity policy is implemented and how the board assesses the
effectiveness of the policy. 137 As a result, a board of directors that does
consider diversity in its hiring process must also identify how they consider
diversity in identifying candidates.138 Prior to 2010, the SEC did not require
publicly traded companies to collect or report any information regarding
diversity.139 The stated purpose of the new diversity disclosure rule was to
129
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“enhance the information provided in annual reports and proxy information
statements to better enable shareholders to evaluate the leadership of public
companies.”140
The law has two serious loopholes. First, while disclosure is
mandatory, companies are not required to have a diversity policy, and those
that do not have a diversity policy merely disclose that they do not have a
policy in place. 141 As discussed below, this does not follow the letter or
spirit of the law because companies are supposed to disclose more than the
mere existence or non-existence of a diversity policy. Second, companies
are allowed to define diversity “in ways that they consider to be
appropriate.”142 Since the diversity disclosure rule does not require boards
to disclose board diversity by race, gender, or any other identifying
characteristic, the rule has not served to provide investors with meaningful
information.143
C.

Diversity Disclosure Rule Compliance and Outcome

While comply-or-explain disclosure approaches may seem more
politically palatable than mandatory quotas, their effectiveness is
questionable. 144 Comply-or-explain approaches represent a form of
decentralized “new governance regulation” wherein the state does not serve
as the sole or primary regulator.145 The state, in such instances, forms one
part of a pluralistic regulatory environment where the regulated entity itself,
alongside other non-state actors, contributes to the formation of norms and
expectations.146
Many believed that the diversity disclosure rule, which took effect in
2010, would cause companies to add women and other minorities to their

140
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boards of directors, but no such change took place. 147 Fortune 500
corporation proxies from 2012 show that women held an average of 16.6%
of board seats on Fortune 500 company boards. 148 This represents an
increase of less than 2% from 2009, the year immediately preceding the
implementation of the SEC’s diversity disclosure rules.149 Growth of gender
diversity on boards stagnated even under the diversity disclosure rule that
the SEC thought would spur change.150
A study of Fortune 50 proxy statements from 2012 showed that many
companies did not fully comply with the disclosure rule. Notably, over 60%
of companies in the Fortune 50 category failed to comply with the diversity
disclosure rule because they failed to disclose some or all of the required
information.151 About 10% of Fortune 50 companies completely failed to
mention “diversity” in their 2012 proxy. 152 About 12.5% of Fortune 50
companies merely included a statement as to whether “diversity” was
considered in their board selection process (6 yes, 1 no).153 About half of
Fortune 50 companies included a statement about whether and how they
considered diversity in board nominations, but they did not include any
information about how they implement their diversity policy or assess its
success.154 Only about 25% of Fortune 50 companies fully complied with
the SEC diversity disclosure requirements in their 2012 proxy statements.155
Some companies bypass the diversity disclosure requirement
altogether by including a simple statement that the company does not have a
fixed policy with regard to seeking diversity among board candidates. 156
However, the SEC’s rule does not differentiate between formal or informal
147
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policies but rather requires disclosure of any considerations of diversity that
are part of the board nominating process. 157 Companies use the words
“formal” and “specific” in proxies to reject the existence of an official
diversity policy and to justify the company’s failure to elaborate further.158
Even the SEC Commissioner, Luis Aguilar, has underscored the weaknesses
in the current disclosure system, including a lack of compliance by many
companies.159
Allowing companies to define diversity themselves leads to
superficial and uninformative diversity disclosures.160 In 2012, only 43% of
the Fortune 50 companies’ proxy statements mentioned “gender” in their
descriptions of diversity.161 Since the SEC has provided no guidelines for
defining diversity, companies have developed their own criteria. For
instance, IBM’s 2012 proxy statement says that the board and hiring
committee “focus on ensuring that the Board reflects a diversity of
experiences, backgrounds and individuals . . . The Committee recommends
candidates based on their business or professional experience, the diversity
of their background, and their talents and perspectives.” 162 Ford’s diversity
statement is similar, mentioning diversity of “experience in business,
government, education and technology, and in areas that are relevant to the
company’s global activities.” 163
Ultimately, these vague, abstract, or misleading diversity statements
are unhelpful to shareholders who wish to evaluate whether companies are

157
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implementing policies to improve gender diversity. 164 Most companies do
not comply with the current diversity disclosure rule, but even when they do,
the disclosures they make are not always helpful. Furthermore, when
companies do not comply with the disclosure requirements, the SEC does
not enforce the rule.165
Without a strong mandate from Congress, the SEC is unlikely to
enforce or strengthen its promotion or regulation of diversity on corporate
boards. Within a regulatory regime that is designed to protect investors from
financial risk or fraud, lack of diversity on boards will remain a low priority
unless and until it is shown that a lack of diversity causes a financial risk.
IV.

NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO INCREASE CORPORATE
BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY: RADICAL INTERVENTION MODEL

Norway was a global trendsetter in 2003 when it became the first
developed country to enact a gender quota law applicable to corporate
boards of directors of public companies. 166 The quota policy affected
approximately 500 public limited liability companies and publicly owned
enterprises and dramatically changed the gender balance on Norwegian
corporate boards.167
A.

Overview of Norwegian Corporate Law

Norwegian corporate law requires the board of directors to fulfill both
management and supervisory duties.168 The Norwegian Limited Liabilities
Companies Act (The Norwegian Act) applies to all public limited liability
companies, which are known as allmennaksjeselskap, or ASA firms, and sets
out the basic governance and structural requirements for such firms.169 The
Norwegian Act applies only to public limited liability companies, so
164
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privately held companies are not subject to its requirements. 170 The
Norwegian Act specifies that management responsibilities be assigned to a
“general manager,” a CEO, who cannot be a member of the board and must
follow the board’s direction.171 The “general manager” CEO appoints the
rest of the high-level management.172
B.

Norway’s Radical Intervention in Board Diversity: The Quota

In general, the quota law, which is found in the Section 6-11a of the
Norwegian Act, requires 40% representation of the minority gender on the
boards of registered public limited liability companies. 173 The quota law
evolved to its current form in three distinct phases. First, under a
government-industry agreement, compliance with the 40% quota was
voluntary during the two-year period beginning January 1, 2004 and ending
December 31, 2005.174 Under the agreement, if the businesses in the private
sector reached the desired gender representation goals by July 1, 2005, the
mandatory quota law would not take effect.175 A Statistics Norway survey
showed that at the time the deadline passed, only about 13% of ASA
companies had complied with the voluntary quota and only 16% of
Norwegian directors were women.176
Because of this low compliance rate, the rules mandating a 40%
gender quota on boards took effect for public limited liability companies on
January 1, 2006.177 This change marked the beginning of the second phase
of the quota law. Companies were given a two-year period from January 1,
2006 to December 31, 2007 to comply with the 40% required quota. 178
170
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During the transition phase, any new companies seeking to register as public
companies would have to comply fully with the 40% quota in order to be
registered. 179 As of December 2007, women held 37% of board seats in
Norway, up from 6% in 2001 before the law took effect.180
The third phase of implementation began on January 1, 2008 when the
quota officially took effect.181 In its final form, the law requires:
On the board of directors of public limited liability companies,
both sexes shall be represented in the following manner:
1. If the board of directors has two or three members, both
sexes shall be represented.
2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each sex
shall be represented by at least two members.
3. If the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex
shall be represented by at least three members.
4. If the board of directors has nine members, each sex shall be
represented by at least four members, and if the board of
directors has more members, each sex shall represent at least
50 percent of the members of the board.182
The law officially requires 33 to 50 percent representation of the minority
gender depending on the size of the board of directors. The law protects
either women or men as the “minority gender” and requires fairly balanced
representation of both genders. As of January 1, 2008, any ASA company
that did not comply with the law faced dissolution under the normal
enforcement rules provided by The Norwegian Act.183
C.

Diversity Quota Rule Compliance and Outcome

The cost of non-compliance with the Norwegian gender quota law is
high. The Norwegian Act provides for dissolution of a public company by
decree of the court if the company “has not reported to the Register of
Business Enterprises a board of directors which satisfies the requirements of
179
180
181
182
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provisions issued in or pursuant to statute.” 184 If a company does not
comply with the board requirements, the company is given notice and a
period of one month to remedy the problem. 185 If after one month, the
company has not met the gender quota, the government issues a second
notice, this time publicly in the Brønnøysund Register Center’s electronic
bulletin for public announcements.186 The announcement will state that “the
conditions for dissolving the company are satisfied, and that the company is
allowed a period of four weeks from the electronic announcement to remedy
the matter.”187 Once notice to the company has been announced as required,
if the company exceeds the four-week period after the announcement, the
Register of Business Enterprises must notify the District Court that the
company is non-compliant; thereafter, the court must “without additional
notice decide by decree to dissolve the company.”188 Once the court decides
to dissolve the company, the company must be liquidated in accordance with
the Bankruptcy Act and the Creditors Recovery Act. 189
One unintended outcome of the quota law was that a portion of public
companies chose to delist. Quotas are a “command-and-control” type of
regulation that require a hierarchical relationship between the regulator and
the regulated.190 Some companies opted out of that hierarchical relationship
and sought other avenues to profitability. 191 In fact, up to 40% of
Norwegian publicly traded businesses avoided the quota law by converting
to private limited companies. 192 Two-thirds of companies that chose to
delist indicated that the quota rules were behind the decision.193
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While delisting was an unfortunate choice that some public companies
made to avoid the new law, much of the scholarship on the law shows that it
has become widely accepted within operating public ASA companies. On
the individual level, in a qualitative study of 23 Norwegian company
directors covering both men and women of varying experience levels,
researcher Aaron Dhir found that while two-thirds of those interviewed were
opposed to or indifferent to the law initially, after seeing the quota law in
action and experiencing its effects they came to endorse it.194 The study also
showed that directors who might have initially opposed the law because of a
general dislike of “governmental meddling in the private sphere” might
come to support the law “as a necessary evil in disrupting the closed
networks that had previously dominated boardrooms.”195 Norwegian firms
have been forced to broaden their director searches beyond “friends
recruiting friends into the boardrooms.” 196 In supporting the mandatory
quota, some respondents in the Dhir study indicated that, without it,
recruitment based on personal ties and similar backgrounds or characteristics
would continue. 197 It appears that the quota law has been effective at
combatting in-group bias that is a strong factor in keeping women out of the
boardroom. Also of great significance is that the quota law has not had the
drastic negative financial impact that many predicted.198
D.

The Equality Case for Gender Diversity On Boards

The quota law has, however, “arguably had broader social effects by
redistributing power in Norwegian society.” Before the passage of the quota
law, Norway was much like the U.S. in that more women were participating
in higher education than men and yet at least 50% of publicly held
companies had no women on their boards. 199 That important power
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dynamics are at stake is reflected in the fact that many firms did not comply
when the quota was voluntary.” 200
In an official government publication intended to outline the purpose
and principles behind the Norwegian gender balance policy, the official
government position was that, “reaching a balanced participation is a
question of democracy.” 201 In an official publication, the Norwegian
government further clarified:
The Government regards the legislation on women in boards as
an important step towards equality between the sexes, a fairer
society and a more even distribution of power, and as an
important factor in the creation of wealth in society. The
legislation will secure women’s influence on decision making
processes of great importance for the economy in the society. It
is important to make use of all the human resources in our
country, not just half of [them].”202
The acceptance of the quota law may be a reflection of Norway’s
political culture and commitment to egalitarianism. 203 Commitment to
egalitarianism is demonstrated in both public and private policies. 204 For
instance, a number of Norway’s influential political parties adopted 40%
party gender quotas as early as the 1970s.205 In part because of the voluntary
gender quotas undertaken by Norway’s political parties, Norway’s level of
women’s political participation consistently ranks near the highest in the
world. 206 Additionally, Norway has a gender-equal national kindergarten
plan, which mandates that all children have equal opportunity to be seen and
heard and to participate fully in all activities. 207 The focus on Norway’s
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national policies is not simply on improving the status of women, but rather
on achieving gender equality in general. 208
Additionally, unlike the United States, Norway is a signatory of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). 209 The quota law in Norway represents Norway’s
respect for CEDAW, 210 which states that men and women shall have the
right to “the same employment opportunities . . . promotion . . . and equal
treatment in respect of work of equal value.” 211 The quota law “aims to
enforce greater levels of gender equality in the fields of family life, private
work, public work, and politics to enforce gender balance in economic
stewardship.”212
Furthermore, in the private sector in Norway, corporate culture tends
to be “open and nonhierarchical as well as encouraging of parental leave,
flex policies, and work-from-home policies.” 213 The egalitarian effect of
workplace parental leave policies is bolstered by the government sponsored
paid parental leave policy, which “requires that the father take a specific
number of weeks (ten) and the mother take an equal amount.”214 After that,
the parents may divide the rest of the paid leave period as they choose. 215
The official purpose of the “paternal quota” is “to encourage fathers to
participate more in caring for their infant.”216 Norwegian men actually rank
second only after Danish men in the amount of time they spend performing
unpaid work in the home, such as housekeeping and caring for children. 217
Boards achieve diversity-related outcomes when a critical mass of
women, as required by the quota law, serve as directors together. 218 The
208
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quota law in Norway is an attempt to regulate gender inequality by
intervening in the market.219
V.

ANALYSIS

In the history of the modern economy, women have not had a seat at
the boardroom table. Around the globe, momentum has been growing for
gender diversity and female representation on boards, but the pace of change
has been slow. Research shows that myriad intractable, inaccurate
assumptions and entrenched gender stereotypes may be a primary cause of
the lack of women in corporate leadership. Although business leaders and
investors have become aware of the issue and mostly agreed—at least
publicly—that more women must be incorporated into the higher ranks of
corporate leadership, the slow pace of change shows that more thought must
be given to why and how such change will occur.
When we look to Norway, we see that an efficient model for change
exists, one that utilizes radical regulatory intervention as a catalyst for
change. In less than a decade, Norway transformed its corporate boards
from the embodiment of entrenched gender hierarchy to a model of gender
integration. The outcome in Norway has been largely positive as directors’
experience of the change has helped to dispel some of the entrenched
stereotypical thinking about women’s career ambitions and abilities.
In the United States, where regulatory intervention in the private
business sector typically requires economic justifications, the business case
for diversity is not providing adequate motivation for strong intervention.
Similarly, leaders in the business community publicly exalt diversity in the
workplace, but in evaluating their bottom line, many de-prioritize gender
diversity initiatives in favor of other programs in hopes of generating
shorter-term financial gains. As former Kodak CEO, Antonio Perez bluntly
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put it: “the real barrier . . . [is that] corporations don't believe that [diversity]
is a business imperative.”220
The Norwegian experience teaches us important lessons. First, other
policies and programs to promote gender equality formed a foundation for
Norway’s rapid transition to near gender equality on boards. Second,
incorporating large numbers of women onto Norway’s boards of directors
did not reap financial disaster.
Advocates for gender parity on boards of directors in the United
States should advocate for policies and programs that will normalize gender
equality. For example, advocates for equality should petition their
representatives in state and federal legislative bodies to enact paid parental
leave for mothers and fathers. The existence of required paid parental leave
for both mothers and fathers in Norway was noted by scholars and businesspeople alike as laying a foundation for gender equality in the workplace.
The requirement for both parents to take time off to parent an infant shifted
the burden of parenting so that it was more shared between men and women.
The U.S. currently does not have any mandated paid maternity or paternity
leave, but advocates for gender equality should consider the Norway model
when advocating for paid parental leave in the United States. Implementing
leave policies that are mandated for or at least inclusive of both genders will
help change attitudes about women’s roles within the workplace and family.
Furthermore, a number of Norway’s political parties adopted
voluntary 40% gender quotas over the last 40 years. While corporations
may ultimately cling to the business rationale, our political organizations are
not beholden to such measures. In fact, they are charged with the important
work of representing the populace as a whole. Developing avenues for
women to flourish in high-powered leadership roles will help lay the
foundation for more gender diversity on corporate boards. Those who wish
to see change in the gender balance within the leadership at the highest
echelons of the corporate world should promote gender parity in political
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leadership—another important area where women’s actual performance can
begin to tear down the stereotypes about women’s leadership abilities.
Leaders within the corporate world hold a lot of power over this issue,
and while change at the director level may seem risky and costly,
corporations could make changes to internal policies to great effect. For
example, it is time for corporations to divert energy and resources from
diversity recruitment, which most are succeeding at, to diverse and inclusive
promotion and retention policies. Most large corporations succeed at
recruiting women into entry-level positions, but they fail at promotion and
retention of women because their internal policies regarding assignment of
work, evaluations, and parental leave continue to embed androcentric values
and gender stereotypes that devalue women and women’s work. Employees
at all levels should demand these changes.
By working for governmental and workplace policy changes on a
number of fronts, advocates for gender equality on boards can lay the
framework for more radical change. Advocates can increase the rate of
change and create more opportunities for the advancement of women onto
boards of directors in the United States.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While a quota law is not a palatable solution in the U.S., advocates
could work to change the discourse around diversity on boards of directors.
Working to implement more gender equality policies in less controversial
ways will help to set a strong foundation for firmer regulatory intervention
on the subject of gender diversity on boards of directors in U.S. public
companies.

